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Abstract 
 
The  interlocking  relationship  between  environmental  degradation,  poverty, 
and  violent  conflict  has  been  a  prominent  theme  contained  within  the 
literature on sustainable development and conflict resolution since the mid-
twentieth century. While some analysts have argued that violence has not 
been limited to the poor and deprived,  many have concluded from various 
studies  that  the  devastation  of  the  environment,  poverty,  and  conflict  are 
inextricably intertwined. This article examines this theme by analyzing the 
pattern  of  violence  and  nature  of  conflict  resolution  in  the  oil-producing 
enclave of the Niger Delta in the past three decades. A report of the United 
Nations Environment Programme on parts of the Niger Delta published in 
August 2011 reveals that the area is one of the most intensely polluted in the 
world. The report confirms the conclusion of several other earlier reports on 
the Niger Delta, which state that activities relating to the exploitation of oil 
and gas have led to intense environmental pollution and extreme poverty and 
that those conditions have spawned violence. The article is exploratory and 
analytical. It draws from diverse sources, including government records and 
reports of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as well as 
oral information gathered by the author from fieldwork conducted across the 
Niger Delta between 2007 and 2012, to explore the nature of the Niger Delta 
crisis from the 1980s until the present. The article argues that environmental 
degradation  is central  to  the  Niger  Delta  crisis,  as it  has  hampered  rural 
economic  activities  and  posed  a  threat  to  human  security.  The  article 
concludes that the effective tackling of the environmental crisis in the Niger 
Delta would surely reduce poverty and violence in the area. 
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Background and Conceptual Framework 
 
Since the early 1970s, the oil producing enclave of the Niger Delta has been one 
of  the  most  intensely  polluted  areas  of  the  world.  The  pollution,  along  with  severe 
environmental degradation, has largely been a consequence of the region‟s oil production 
and has made it difficult for the inhabitants of the Niger Delta unable to carry out their 
traditional economic activities of fishing and farming, as local land and river systems 
have been too polluted to sustain such activities. This has caused extreme poverty and has 
also spawned violence. By the 1980s, developments in the Niger Delta clearly reflected 
deprivation of its inhabitants, who demonstrated resistance against the government and its 
oil producing agencies. This pattern confirms aspects of the assertion that Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler make in their analysis of the nature and causes of civil wars in Africa, 
namely  that  greed  and  grievance  are  the  central  issues  in  the  outbreak  of  inter-state 
violent conflicts (2001). Their grievance argument certainly fits the experience of the 
Niger Delta, where intense violence against the Nigerian state and multinational oil firms 
took place for over three decades, until it began to abate in 2010, following steps taken by 
the government to address some of the fundamental causes of the deprivation of delta 
residents (e.g. by providing basic amenities and training Niger Delta youths). Though 
these  steps  are  commendable,  the  government  has  yet  to  substantially  address  the 
environmental degradation that oil production has caused. For nearly forty years, most 
multinational  oil  companies  in  the  Niger  Delta  have  operated  with  very  little 
consideration  for  the  environment,  which  has  negatively  affected  the  rural  economic 
activities of the people and led to an overall low quality of life (Jike, 2004, pp. 686-688; 
The Guardian, 1999, p. 3).  Issues relating to pollution must therefore also be seriously 
addressed in order to maintain lasting peace to be achieved in the area. 
  In his concept of protracted social conflict, the conflict resolution theoretician 
Edward  Azar  establishes  a  link  between  deprivation  of  basic  human  needs  and  the 
potential  for  violent  conflict,  especially  against  the  nation  or  state  responsible  for 
inflicting the deprivation.  Azar describes basic needs as ontological and non-negotiable. 
Therefore, he says, the failure of a state to meet or protect its residents‟ basic human 
needs creates the potential for violence, which becomes protracted as long as the basic 
needs  remain  neglected  (Azar,  1990,  p.  155).    Azar‟s  ideas  on  the  interlocking 
relationship  between  the  absence  of  human  security  and  protracted  civil  conflict  are 
similar  to  the  idea  of  grievance  as  an  important  factor  in  Africa‟s  internal  conflicts 
presented by Collier and Hoeffler and to an earlier corollary presented by Johan Galtung.  
According to Galtung, the simple absence of violence does not necessarily indicate peace, 
particularly if the condition of deprivation still exists; in other words, even a seemingly 
peaceful environment is not ultimately peaceful unless the apparent lack of violence is 
accompanied by social justice. Without social justice, argues Galtung, the best that can be 
experienced  is  “negative  peace,”  a  condition  in  which  latent  conflict  exists  even  if 
hostilities are not taking place (1990, pp. 291-305). 
  Aspects  of  the perspectives  of Galtung  and Azar relating to  the  link between 
neglected basic human needs and violent conflict, as well as that of Collier and Hoeffler 
on grievance by a group as a cause of internal conflict are applied to the Niger Delta 
experience in this article. It is true that several other factors are discernible as causes of 
conflict in the Niger Delta, such as land disputes between some ethnic groups in the area Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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and disagreements over the location of amenities. It is indisputable, however, that issues 
relating  to  deprivation  and  economic  injustice  are  some  of  the  most  significant 
contributors to violence in the Niger Delta. Azar‟s ideas about the conditions under which 
violence is likely to take place are also applied. After an analysis of about sixty civil 
wars,  Azar  also  concludes  that  the  vast  majority  of  states  that  experience  lingering 
internal  conflict  “tend  to  be  characterized  by  incompetent,  parochial,  fragile,  and 
authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs” (Azar, 1990, p. 10).  
Azar‟s perspective here is very important to this study because it helps to explain aspects 
of the checkered fortunes of those involved in the Niger Delta crisis and the processes of 
conflict resolution under the Ibrahim Babangida dictatorship (1985-1993), the Abacha 
tyranny (1993-1998), and the civilian governments of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), 
Umaru Yar‟Adua, and Goodluck Jonathan (2007-date) (Falola & Heaton, 2008, pp. 216-
242).  The concept of protracted social conflict also sheds light on the crucial role of 
governance  and  political  action  in  both  causing  internal  conflict  and  in  carrying  out 
effective conflict resolution. Aspects of the ideas of Galtung and Azar as well as those of 
Collier and Hoeffler thus refine the understanding of the Niger Delta violence. 
  Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has accompanied the exploitation 
of oil and gas in the region since the 1950s.  The pollution has hampered the traditional 
economic  activities  of  farming  and  fishing,  which  have  been  the  major  sources  of 
livelihood of the vast majority of the people  (it is estimated that up to 70 percent of the 
population engage in fishing and farming). This inability to fish or farm has led to intense 
poverty and the inability of the people of the Niger Delta to meet the most basic of their 
needs. Potable water sources have also been polluted in the course of prospecting for oil 
and gas (Bakare, 2009, p. 3).  These conditions have combined to pose a threat to human 
security in the Niger Delta. To worsen matters, only a small fraction (1.5 to 13 percent) 
of all oil revenues  earned by the central  government  since the mid-1980s  have been 
allocated for the development of the area (Aworawo, 2012, pp. 44-45; Akinyele, 1998, p. 
83).  It is for this reason that economic injustice and human security are regarded as 
central to the Niger Delta conflict and its resolution.     
  While a number of activities such as bush burning and the indiscriminate dumping 
of domestic and industrial waste have also contributed to the pollution of the environment 
in the Niger Delta, it is the exploitation and production of oil that has had the greatest 
deleterious impact on the physical environment, as indicated by several sources on the 
Niger  Delta.  As  such,  this  paper  examines  the  nature  and  impact  of  environmental 
degradation  on  the  Niger  Delta.  It  explores  the  interlocking  relationship  between 
environmental degradation, political action, economic crisis, and the level of success of 
conflict resolution efforts in the Niger Delta and contends that social unrest in the area 
has been caused as much by the delta‟s residents‟ desire for a greater share of the central 
government‟s oil earnings as it is by their inability to maintain economic stability and 
earn  a  decent  living  due  largely  to  the  environmental  pollution  caused  by  the 
government‟s pursuit of oil.  
  A number of studies have been carried out on the Niger Delta unrest and the 
efforts at conflict resolution in the area. Much of the research has focused on the people‟s 
agitation for the control of resources and the violence that has accompanied it. Some of 
the studies have also examined the impact of oil exploitation on the physical environment 
of the Niger Delta. (Okecha, 2000, pp. 51-61; Osuntokun, 2001, pp. 494-495; Imevbore, Journal of International and Global Studies 
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1997,  pp.  48).    This  paper  presents  an  analysis  of  the  agitation  for  of  the  central 
government‟s oil revenue and the call for it to be allocated to the regional government for 
the development of the oil-producing communities (Obi, 1995, pp. 16-20; Ukaogo, 2008, 
pp. 91-112).  This work adds a fresh dimension to the study of the Niger Delta crisis by 
also focusing on the impact of environmental degradation on the rural economy, political 
action, and the overall conflict resolution efforts in the area (and not just the struggle for 
a greater share of the revenue from oil sales).  
  An important aspect of the environmental degradation and violence in the Niger 
Delta is that the causes and impact of the crisis are well known to political and business 
leaders whose policies and action are needed to tackle the problem. For instance, it is 
generally acknowledged that activities related to the exploration and production of oil and 
gas constitute the greatest obstacle to the maintenance of a healthy environment in the 
Niger Delta.  There has, however, been a wide gap between knowledge and action. To 
illustrate,  Nigeria‟s  political  leaders  and  executives  of  oil  companies  have  agreed  at 
various  times  to  end  gas  flaring,
1  which contributes tremendously to environmental 
pollution and of which Nigeria is  by one of the guiltiest of the world‟s oil producers.  
Several deadlines have been set to end gas flaring, but none have been met, and different 
excuses  have  been  given  for  why  the  targets  have  not  been  realized  (The  Guardian, 
2011a, p. 9). Some of Nigeria‟s oil companies have complained about the high cost of 
installing the required equipment necessary to end gas flaring, but different government 
agencies and the people of the delta region have described such excuses as unsatisfactory. 
Similar failed  promises  to  provide infrastructure development  and to  address  poverty 
reduction abound.  Promises are made but not fulfilled, leading to violent reactions from 
the people of the Niger Delta. The number of failed promises and continued degradation 
of the environment has led to a general lack of trust on the part of delta people of the state 
leaders (be they business, political, or even local, traditional leaders). Indeed, a common 
saying in the Niger Delta about any promise made by leaders at different levels is that “it 
is in the pipeline,” which is another way of saying that it will never be fulfilled.  In fact, 
in an absurd but apropos episode a few years ago, some petroleum pipeline vandals who 
were arrested by security agents claimed that they broke the pipes to siphon petroleum 
products because the good life they had been promised by the government was “in the 
pipeline” (Mbu, 2011). This rather harmless incident is nonetheless a reflection of both 
the frustration felt by the people of the Niger Delta and the complexity of the crisis. 
  The trajectory of the Niger Delta crisis has been checkered. Violence has waxed 
and waned depending upon government policy and the level of deprivation experienced 
by  the  people  of  the  Niger  Delta.  Political  action  and  the  nature  of  corporate  social 
responsibility of the industrial establishments operating in the Niger Delta have equally 
influenced the pattern of unrest at different times. For example, oil spills, which pollute 
the environment and hamper economic activities, have always engendered violence. In 
contrast, government policies and programs that improve the quality of life of the people, 
such  as  the  amnesty  program  of  2010,  have  led  to  a  reduction  of  violence.  The 
comparison in this paper of conflict resolution efforts under different governments since 
the late 1980s has been undertaken to establish a link between human security, social 
agitation, political action, and conflict resolution. The paper also draws insights from 
recent developments in the Niger Delta to explain the factors influencing the success (or 
the lack thereof) of conflict resolution efforts. We conclude by broadly analyzing the Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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approaches that have been adopted over the years and their respective levels of success. 
Some measures by which a healthier physical environment can be restored to the Niger 
Delta  to  improve  the  rural  economy  are  also  recommended.  It  is  concluded  that  the 
adoption of the appropriate measures to maintain a healthier physical environment would 
help to substantially reduce violent conflict in the Niger Delta, as such measures would 
make  it  possible  for  the  people  to  engage  in  fruitful  economic  activities  and  reduce 
poverty. 
 
Environment and Pollution: The Niger Delta Experience 
 
The origins of intense environmental pollution in the Niger Delta can be traced to 
the expansion of human activities in the area in the second half of the 19
th century, when 
large quantities of palm oil were produced and exported to Europe. The name  
“Oil Rivers” came to be used to describe the Niger Delta in the second half of the 19
th 
century.  Extensive palm oil production naturally increased human activity in the area, 
and this put some strain on the environment. However, the natural regenerative power of 
the environment would seem to have been adequate to contain the negative effects of 
human  activity  on  the  environment  at  that  time.  This  is  because  the  flora  and  fauna 
remained intact, and farming and fishing (the people‟s major economic activities) went 
on without any known threat posed by environmental pollution (Imevbore, 1997, pp. 37-
39). In short, while palm oil production has been established to cause extensive pollution 
of  the  environment,  the  experience  of  the  Niger  Delta  pollution  arising  from  the 
exploitation of oil and gas has been far more devastating. 
Extensive environmental pollution of the Niger Delta began to take place in the 
1950s,  following  the  installation  of  a  number  of  industrial  establishments  and  the 
commencement  of  oil  exploration  and  production.  Such  oil  production  efforts  were 
expanded  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  and,  by  the  1980s,  the  level  of  environmental 
degradation in the delta region had reached the level of a crisis. Over the years, non-oil 
manufacturing industries in the Niger Delta have been few, and the damage caused by the 
emission of effluents from non-oil industries has been minimal (Durotoye, 2000, pp. 32-
33).  It has been oil exploitation and production that has ravaged the delta region‟s natural 
environment; crude oil exports from the Niger Delta have averaged two million barrels 
per day since the mid-1970s. Additionally, a large amount of gas is also exported from 
the area. Together, the exploration and production of oil and gas constitute the single 
most devastating source of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta (Okecha, 2000, pp. 
52-58). 
All  activities  linked  with  the  various  stages  of  oil  exploration  and  production 
negatively affect the environment.  Petroleum production operations lead to pollution as a 
result of drill cuttings, drilling mud, the fluids used to stimulate production, the chemicals 
injected  into  the  earth  to  control  corrosion  or  to  separate  oil  from  water,  and  the 
production of general industrial waste.  Added to all of this is the problem of gas flaring 
and incidents of oil spill and blow outs. Gas production is a natural by-product of crude 
oil production, but, in Nigeria, until 2005, about 80 percent of the gas associated with oil 
exploration was flared or “burned off” (Igwe, 2009, pp. 6-9).  It is estimated that an 
average of two billion standard feet of gas was flared in Nigeria per day in the 1980s and 
1990s, enough to provide electricity for the whole of West Africa (Akinyeye, 1997, pp. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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93-94).    Aside  from  the  obvious  issue  of  waste,  gas  flaring  involves  the  release  of 
significant quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which causes acid rain and 
contributes to global warming.  The flame from the flaring itself destroys crops, and 
when the flame is put out, very thick smoke emanates, which causes air pollution (Igwe, 
2009, pp. 3-5).  This has been the daily experience of the oil producing communities of 
the Niger Delta, and it partly explains why the exploitation and production of oil and gas 
have  so  negatively  affected  the  rural  economy  of  the  area,  which  is  dominated  by 
subsistence farming and fishing. 
In addition to the damage that results from daily oil production activity, there is 
also  the  environmental  impact  of  unexpected  incidents  of  blowout  and  oil  spillage. 
Blowout and spillage, though typically highly undesired by any oil producing entity, are a 
rampant feature of oil exploration and production in Nigeria.  In a period of four years, 
from 1976 to 1980, about 800 incidents of oil spillage were reported, and from 1980 to 
1990, about 2,000 incidents occurred.  From 1990 to 1995, about 710 other cases of 
spillage were said to have occurred.  In all, from 1976 to 1995, there were more than 
3,500 incidents of oil spillage, resulting in the discharge of more than 2 million barrels of 
crude oil into the land, swamps, and offshore environments (Petroleum News, 1998, p. 1).  
The trend has not changed much throughout the first decade of the 21
st century. From 
2000 to 2010, about a thousand cases of oil spillage were also recorded in Nigeria‟s oil-
producing enclave, resulting in extensive damage to the environment. This number of 
spills borders on absurd, and the impact of such carelessness and such devastation to the 
environment and the rural economy of the people of the Niger Delta cannot be overstated 
(Okere,  2013).    To  understand  the  deleterious  impact  of  oil  spillage  on  the  physical 
environment  of  the  Niger  Delta,  it  would  be  instructive  to  consider  some  specific 
examples of the incidents of blowouts in the area.  
One of the most well reported cases of oil spillage in the Niger Delta was the 
Texaco‟s Funiwa No. 5 oil blow out, which occurred on 17 January 1980.  The spillage 
went on for thirteen days, until it burst into flames.  About 250,000 barrels of oil were 
discharged, polluting and devastating everything in the path of the inferno.  Four villages 
became uninhabitable, and the Sagama River became fouled excessively, with fish and 
other marine life destroyed.  In addition, 350 hectares of mangrove were left dead, and 
for a long time, the people who inhabited the area around the fishing town of Funiwa 
subsisted  on  food  and  water  provided  by  the  Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Company 
(NNPC) in the form of relief (Mowoe, 1990, p. 174).  This was only one of the 4,500 
blowouts that have occurred in the Niger Delta from 1976 to the present. 
Similar experiences were recorded in the Mobil Habo oil spill of January 1981 
and the Jones Creek blowout shortly thereafter. The Mobil Habo blowout began on 12 
January 1981, when an estimated 40,000 barrels of oil was spilled. Although this spill 
was  considered  small  in  comparative  terms,  the  oil  spread  from  the  immediate 
environment in the state of Akwa Ibom to the states of Rivers, Cross River, Edo, Delta, 
and Ondo.  It even spread 85 kilometers into the Atlantic going as far as Benin, Togo, and 
Ghana (Petroleum News, 1998, p. 1).  As the spilled oil spread far and wide, so it polluted 
the soil and water in its path and destroyed flora and fauna. A similar experience was 
recorded in Shell‟s Jones Creek spill, which involved an estimated 20,000 barrels of oil.  
The Jones Creek spill occurred on land and affected some 28 communities, some of 
which had to be relocated.  The spill fouled the soil, and Shell managed to recover only Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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4,000 barrels of the spilled oil around the Jones creek flow station (Petroleum News, 
1998, pp. 1-2).
 
These few examples of oil spillage are indicative of the massive environmental 
degradation that has ultimately been caused by oil spillage in the Niger Delta region for 
nearly half a century. Oil spillage causes massive damage to the ecosystem.  It damages 
the soil and destroys crops and mangrove forests. It also pollutes sources of drinking 
water and kills fish, birds, periwinkles, mollusks, and crabs.  Since the rural economy of 
the people of the Niger Delta revolves around fishing and farming, the impact of oil spill 
on the people of the Niger Delta, especially the rural dwellers, has been grave. There is 
also the pollution caused to land and water by the emission of effluents from refineries 
emitted in the course of production, as well as the general industrial waste from  the 
petrochemical and fertilizer companies in the Niger Delta.  All these sources of pollution, 
combined  with  the  massive  gas  flaring  already  noted,  cause  immense  damage  to  the 
environment (Igwe, 2009, pp. 3-5).  
 
The Nature of Niger Delta Rural Economy 
 
It is important to describe the nature of the rural economy of the Niger Delta to 
understand the impact of pollution on human security in the area. First, the nature of the 
geography is described to provide an insight into the structure of the rural economy.  The 
Niger Delta area  of  Nigeria  falls  within the  coastal  zone  that lies  along the Atlantic 
Ocean.  The area is connected to the hinterland by a number of river systems that flow 
into the Atlantic in the south.  Much of the area is composed of marshland and mangrove 
swamp, which is susceptible to flooding.  The soil varies from the older, leached coastal 
soils,  which  comprise  primarily  sand  and  are  found  under  forest  cover,  to  younger, 
alluvial soils, which consist of unconsolidated sediments (including primarily silt and 
some  sand)  that  have  been  eroded  and  reshaped  by  water  and  re-deposited  inland. 
Rainfall is generally heavy in the Niger Delta. Due to these conditions, only a fraction of 
the land in the Niger Delta is arable. Nonetheless, the dominant economic activities of 
this rural area has always been farming and fishing. (To a lesser degree, the people of the 
Niger Delta area have also engaged in salt making and trading.)  It is estimated that as 
much  as  65  percent  of  the  people  of  the  area  engage  in  farming  and  fishing,  using 
traditional methods (Gbadegesin, 1998: p. 42). This has been the situation for centuries.  
Land is therefore crucial to the survival of the people of the Niger Delta, as are the rivers 
where the people carry out their fishing. 
The crops of the Niger Delta ecological zone include cassava, yams, cocoyam, 
plantain, sweet potatoes, rice, maize, melon, and leafy vegetables.  The tree crops include 
rubber and oil palm.  The traditional tools of hoes, cutlasses, and axes are used for the 
cultivation of these crops.  For fishing, the people use nets and all kinds of traps. From 
the salty water and the mangrove, too, the people engage in salt making. And through the 
numerous rivers and footpaths, the people carry the surplus of what they produce to be 
sold in the markets.  The rural economy of the Niger Delta is thus simple, and it has 
generally met the needs of the people for centuries. However, the subsistence of the delta 
residents has changed in recent times, following the pollution of the soil and water arising 
mainly from the exploration and production of oil and gas. Thus, while food production 
was generally increasing around the world during much of the 20
th century (as Green Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Revolution  programs  were  launched  in  many  countries,  as  noted  by  Mc  Neil  in  his 
Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 20
th Century World) 
(2000, p. 275), food production was decreasing in the Niger Delta. The 2011 report by 
the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  (UNEP)  on  parts  of  the  Niger  Delta 
(Ogoniland) states, “While fishing was once a prime activity in Ogoniland, it was evident 
from community feedback and field observations that it has essentially ceased in areas 
polluted by oil” (UNEP, 2011, p. 10). Environmental degradation negatively affected 
human security in the delta region, as a large section of the population could no longer 
meet  their  basic  economic  needs  as  harvests  dwindled  from  farms  and  rivers.  It  is 
therefore easy to understand the potential for violence in the area, particularly in the two 
last decades of the 20
th century.  
Information  from  different  sources,  including  reports  published  by  different 
intergovernmental  agencies  and  non-governmental  organizations,  as  well  as  the  oral 
testimonies of delta residents collected by the author from fieldwork conducted between 
2007 and 2012, confirms that the deprivation caused by disruption to farming and fishing 
has  been  a  major  cause  of  violence  in  the  Niger  Delta  (Obi  1995;  Okecha,  2000; 
Onosode, 2000; Obaro, 2007; Osagie, 2012). It is noteworthy that the trend of deprivation 
leading to violence is not limited to the Niger Delta. The response of the people of the 
Gulf of Mexico, for example, to the massive BP oil spill of April to July 2010, which 
destroyed flora and fauna and negatively affected economic activities including tourism 
at a crucial time of the year, generated angry social ferment and resulted in significant 
compensation payments by BP (New York Times, 2013). 
 
Environmental Pollution, Human Security, and Violence 
 
The environmental  degradation of the Niger Delta  has  negatively  affected the 
economic activities of the people and, consequently, human security.  Oil spillage and gas 
flaring are the two most significant causes of pollution in the Niger Delta. Indeed, entire 
communities have had to be resettled in many cases due to oil spillage.  So pervasive has 
the  negative  impact  of  oil  spillage  been  that  the  usually  unconcerned  Nigerian 
government set up a committee on National Oil Spills in 1996 (Petroleum News, 1998, p. 
1).
  The committee has noted that not only has oil spillage has done serious damage to the 
ecosystem but also that petroleum producing companies have been grossly ill-prepared to 
respond  to  oil  spill  emergencies.    The  Clean  Nigeria  Associates  (CAN),  an  oil  spill 
coalition  group,  is  unable  to  handle  emergencies  involving  a  spill  of  more  than 
approximately 30,000 barrels.  It was partly for this reason that when the Mobil Idaho oil 
spill occurred in January 1998, the company had to fly in experts from Mobil Corporation 
in the United States to assist in the spill control efforts.   
  The environmental damage caused by industrialization and activities linked to the 
exploration and production of oil and gas in the Niger Delta has been extensive. A study 
carried out in 1995 revealed that between 1992 and 1993, the total area under major food 
crop production in the states of Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta (Nigeria‟s major oil producing 
areas) had decreased by an average of about 25 percent (Gbadegesin, 1998, p. 45).
 
 The 
decrease  in  food  production  is  generally  attributed  to  the  increasing  incidents  of  oil 
spillage, which destroyed farmlands.  Such a decrease in food production constitutes a 
serious threat to the security of delta residents.  It is estimated, for example, that of the Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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2,185,000 hectares that make up the land area of Rivers and Bayelsa States, about half are 
swampland, leaving only half of each state viable for farming.  In Delta State, about a 
third of its 1,769,800 hectares are similarly swampy. However, as viable farmland is lost 
to oil spillage and other activities connected with petroleum production, the means of 
livelihood for the people of the region is compromised, which raises serious questions 
regarding economic justice. The conviction of the people that their land is being exploited 
in a manner that hampers their economic pursuits and subsistence, with virtually nothing 
to replace their losses, has precipitated violent responses against the government and oil 
producing companies. The pattern of the acquisition of land by the government has also 
contributed to conflict. A decree by the central government promulgated in 1978 grants 
the  government  authority  over  all  lands  in  the  country,  the  implication  being  that 
government may acquire any land with mineral resource endowments; a paltry sum is 
sometimes paid to the original owners of that land after a great deal of effort to secure 
remuneration, though such land owners are often paid nothing (Obioha, 2004). 
  The  impact  of  environmental  degradation  on  the  informal  sector  of  the  Niger 
Delta is clear and wide-ranging.  The indigenous people, the oil producing companies, 
and  the  Nigerian  State  commonly  acknowledge  that  petroleum  production  and  other 
industrial activities in the area have had serious negative effects on the local economy. 
This is also confirmed by the report of the Niger Delta Environment Survey, which states 
that pollution has caused severe deprivation to Niger Delta people (Eteng, 1998, p. 20), 
and by the information given by people of diverse backgrounds in the area in the course 
of fieldwork by the author from 2007 to 2012 (Akpojeoto, 2007; Ifiok, 2009; Ebiowei, 
2009;  Okilo,  2011).    In  essence,  the  Nigerian  government  and  the  oil  producing 
companies have not been responsive to the needs of the people of the Niger Delta despite 
the significant revenue made from the sale of oil exploited from the area, the production 
of which has hampered local economic activities.  To worsen matters, the government 
and their oil producing agencies have also not allowed the people of the Niger Delta to 
help themselves. 
  The intense violence that has rocked the Niger Delta in the last three decades is 
linked to deprivation caused by the inability of the people to carry out fruitful economic 
activities.  As indicated by different sources on the Niger Delta and the testimonies of the 
people,  including  community  leaders,  activists,  women  leaders,  militant  youths,  and 
others,  pollution  has  indeed  been  the  bane  of  the  rural  economy  (Edoka,  2007; 
Alesoghene, 2007; Preye, 2009). The seriousness of the impact of environmental security 
in the Niger Delta can be appreciated from a recent report which states that in Ogoniland 
(one of the major oil producing areas of the Niger Delta) in the 1990s, more people were 
dying than were being born.  The same report notes that while the average life expectancy 
of Nigerians was 56 years during the same period, the Ogoni people had dropped to 12 
years of age (The Guardian, 1999, p. 41).  While this figure might be disputed by some, 
what  it  does  indicate  is  the  dire  quality  of  life  of  the  Ogoni  people  and  of  the  vast 
majority of the oil-producing communities in  the Niger Delta.  It  is  therefore easy to 
understand why Ogoniland sabotaged oil production in the Niger Delta and presented 
some of the fiercest resistance to the Nigerian state for much of the 1990s.  
  One of the leading voices of the Ogoni people, the playwright Kenule Beeson 
Saro-Wiwa, was executed by the General Abacha dictatorship in November 1995 due to 
his  relentless  campaign  against  environmental  degradation  and  for  economic  rights Journal of International and Global Studies 
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(Aworawo, 2002, p. 226)   The intensity of the agitations under his leadership eventually 
led to the suspension of oil exploitation in Ogoniland for some years, and some are of the 
view  that  this  may  have  helped  to  save  the  Ogoni  from  a  possible  extinction.  It  is 
noteworthy that Shell BP, the major oil producing company in Ogonilang before the 
1995-1996 crisis,  worked closely with  government  as  the crisis  raged.  It  even had  a 
detachment of the military and police at its disposal, which it ordered at will to protect its 
interests. It is for this reason that violence was directed at the oil companies as much as 
against the government at the height of the conflict in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
escalation of violence equally drew the attention of the international community, and the 
United States did take action by stationing US marines 150 miles off the Niger Delta 
coast (Ukaogo, 2008, pp. 102-107; Mbu, 2011). There has therefore been an extensive 
international dimension to the Niger Delta crisis. 
  The violence also affected the rest of he Niger Delta but in different shades and to 
different degrees.  In Oto Owhe, in the Isoko North Local Government area of Delta 
State,  for  example,  a  1985  report  revealed  the  presence  of  a  fairly  large  number  of 
psychologically  disoriented  people  who  roamed  the  streets  “baring  their  teeth  and 
frowning as if to depict the anger of the gods” (Newswatch, 1985, p. 17). 
 A few of them 
who volunteered to speak were reported to have complained about the disappearance of 
their means of livelihood due to the pollution of their land and water.  If the condition of 
the psychologically disoriented people was actually caused by the deprivation of their 
means of livelihood due to pollution, then the impact of economic injustice to the people 
of this part of the Niger Delta should be unimaginable.  
  Other reports indicate that there is also now a gender angle to the environmental 
devastation of the Niger Delta (Agbu and Oche, 2012, pp. 47-54; Isoje, 1997). In 1984, 
there was the Oghafe women‟s uprising, and in 1985, a group of women seized Shell‟s 
Odidi  fields  in  the  Warri  North  Local  Government  Area  of  Delta  State,  disrupting 
production for ten days (Obi, 1995, p. 20).  This group of women embarked on their 
militant action to protest the destruction of their crops by a spill that had taken place at 
that time.  There was also the Ekpan Women‟s uprising in 1986, which was linked to the 
disruption of their means of livelihood.  One source notes that the protesting women were 
ordinarily peace loving.  They resorted to violent protests having been compelled by the 
destruction  of  their  means  of  livelihood  largely  because  of  the  activities  of  the  oil 
producing companies (Obi, 1995, p. 20).  The action of the protesting women can be 
appreciated from the experience of Ughoton community (another oil producing area of 
Delta State) in November 1991.  This community of 1,200 people woke up one morning 
to discover that their dwelling place had been cordoned off by men of the Dubri Oil 
Company because of an oil spill.  The people were ordered to  stay indoors.   It  was 
planting season.  The people could not go to their farms, and most had no food at home.  
Tragically, farms were set to be destroyed by the blowout required to maintain the spill.  
The company responded by bringing 200 tubers of yam, 10 bags of rice, and two tins of 
palm oil for a community of 1,200, which was grossly inadequate.  It should have been 
no wonder why the people were quickly up in arms against Dubri Oil (Resolute, 1992, p. 
14).
 
  These examples of violence in delta region communities show that oil production, 
though  it  is  the  most  crucial  factor  in  Nigeria‟s  economic  life-line,  has  disastrously 
affected  the  Niger  Delta  people,  especially  the  rural  communities,  threatening  their Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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physical environment and biodiversity. This means a disruption of the people‟s fragile 
peasant  economy  and,  consequently,  their  means  of  livelihood  and  survival.  This 
disruption is also at the root of the violence in the Niger Delta, although in recent times, 
some individuals have attempted to capitalize on the situation and perpetrate criminal 
activities such as the kidnapping of innocent workers and school children from whose 
employers and parents they demand ransom. However, the general pattern has been that 
violence  has  occurred  when  some  action  by  the  government  or  the  oil-producing 
companies negatively affects the economic fortunes of the people. 
 
Political Action, Poverty, and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta 
 
Extreme  poverty  has  been  a  fundamental  feature  of  the  socio-economic 
development of the Niger Delta since the early 1970s. This is especially so for the rural 
populations whose productivity has become progressively compromised due mainly to 
environmental  pollution.  The  revenue  that  accrues  from  oil  sales  goes  to  the 
governments,  and  so  the  government  bears  much  of  the  responsibility  for  the 
environmental protection of the oil producing areas and the improvement of the standard 
of living for the people in the region. This makes political action central to the provision 
of human security and the protection of the environment of the Niger Delta, both of 
which are central to conflict resolution in the area.  The role of government in the process 
of finding a lasting solution to the environmental devastation of the Niger Delta is a 
complex  one,  considering  the  fact  that  a  government  agency,  the  Nigeria  National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), functions as a joint venture partner to the oil producing 
companies in Nigeria. The NNPC and its subsidiaries represent government interest and 
collect its rents in the production and sale of oil and gas. Therefore, the environmental 
hazard that oil production poses often comes against the interest of government (Ukaogo, 
2008, pp. 104-107; Khan, 1994, pp.1-4). Further problematically, this conflict of interest 
is set against the background of a culture of corruption that has characterized public life 
in Nigeria, especially the oil sector (Falola & Heaton 2008, pp. 185-189, 272-274). 
  It is generally known that the oil producing companies in Nigeria do not meet the 
basic  international  standards  required  of  agencies  conducting  oil  exploration  and 
exploitation.  This is clearly indicated by the excessive percentage of gas flared in the 
process of oil exploitation. Neither do the oil companies have the capacity to prevent or 
manage the numerous cases of oil spillage. Most of the time, the little that is done to limit 
damage to the environment following an oil spill is undertaken only after violent protests 
by local communities. The Nigerian government has equally demonstrated a lack of will 
to compel compliance with the standards because of its own interests. It is only in the last 
decade or so that decisive steps have begun to be taken to protect the environment. Even 
such action was only inspired after massive violent action taken by the people of the 
Niger Delta region to compel the government to respond, and the response has yielded 
only modest results (Jike, 2004, pp. 686-688). 
  The  first  major  step  to  establish  an  institutional  framework  for  environmental 
protection  was  taken  with  the  establishment  of  the  Environmental  Planning  and 
Protection Division (EPPD) in 1975 (Thompson, 2000, pp. 63-64).  It is instructive to 
note that the environmental problems of the Niger Delta were a major concern for the 
EPPD,  as  was  desert  encroachment  in  northern  Nigeria.  However,  although  the Journal of International and Global Studies 
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government agency was conscious of the devastation of the environment in the Niger 
Delta, their efforts were limited by inadequate funds, facilities, and political support to 
deal  with  the  problems.  Its  achievements  were  therefore  modest.  Nigeria‟s  central 
government took another major step towards promoting a healthy environment in the 
Niger Delta region with the creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(FEPA) in 1988. Instructively, the establishment of FEPA was influenced by the dumping 
of toxic waste in the Niger Delta community of Koko by an Italian firm (Anyaegbunam, 
2000,  pp.  102-105).    As  if  the  environmental  problems  of  the  Niger  Delta  were  not 
enough, the toxic waste from Italy was dumped in Koko, devastating the environment 
and causing near immediate deaths, killing village members, including the local chief 
who was said to have granted permission for the dumping.  
  FEPA was established to, among other things, advise the Federal Government of 
Nigeria  on  national  environmental  policies,  prepare  periodic  master  plans  for  the 
development of science and technology relating to the environment, set environmental 
guidelines  and  standards,  and  monitor  and  enforce  compliance  with  environmental 
regulations (Thompson, 2000, p. 63).  FEPA received far more government support than 
had the EPPD before it, and it generally performed well before it was replaced by the 
Ministry of the Environment in 1999. FEPA maintained a firm position and monitored 
compliance with environmental standards. It was also deeply involved in the commitment 
made  by  oil  companies  to  adhere  to  deadlines  to  end  gas  flaring.  (Incidentally,  the 
subsequently created environment ministry does not appear to have been as active as 
FEPA in spite of its elaborate bureaucracy.) The not-too-impressive performance of the 
government agencies with the responsibility of protecting the environment and the lack of 
political will by the government have all but ensured that the Niger Delta environmental 
crisis will persist in spite of the apparent activities the government agencies have taken to 
curtail the crisis. The inability to substantially improve the condition of the environment 
has  continued to  hamper the availability of  resources  to  meet  the  basic needs  of the 
people of the Niger Delta.  
  The failure of the government and the insensitivity of the oil producing companies 
operating in the Niger Delta have led to violent reactions from the people of the area at 
different times since the early 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, as the economic 
fortunes  of  the  people  worsened  following  government  adoption  of  a  structural 
adjustment program, violent agitation in the Niger Delta expanded greatly. At that time, 
the government was compelled to take action to respond to some of the demands of the 
people. A major response of the government was the establishment of the Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 for the purpose of 
undertaking  infrastructure  development  for  the  Niger  Delta,  promoting  a  healthier 
environment, and improving the quality of life of the Delta people (Akinyele, 1997, pp. 
83-84). The need to pay special attention to the development of the Niger Delta owing to 
previous neglect and the peculiarities of its environmental problems had been recognized 
for decades. Indeed, decades earlier, the Willink Minorities Commission, established by 
the  British  colonial  authorities  in  1957,  had  recommended  that  the  Niger  Delta  be 
designated a special area with  development  boards or special  agencies  established to 
address  its  peculiar  problems  (Government  of  Nigeria,  1958,  pp.  94-95).    The 
government‟s  failure  to  comprehensively  address  the  environmental  and  economic 
challenges  of  the  Niger  Delta  therefore  arose  from  lack  of  political  will  and  not Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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necessarily a lack of information on the problem and how to address it. This lack of 
political will on the part of the government was met with intense agitation on the part of 
the delta residents in the late 1980s, compelling the government to attend to the region 
and leading to the establishment of OMPADEC. 
  The objectives of OMPADEC included compensating the communities that had 
suffered ecological and environmental damage or deprivation as a result of oil mineral 
prospecting; opening up the affected areas and effectively linking them up socially and 
economically with the rest of the country by providing different forms of infrastructure 
and physical development; tackling ecological problems caused by the exploration of oil 
mineral;  liaising  with  the  various  oil  companies  on  matters  of  pollution  control;  and 
receiving and administering the monthly sums from the Federation account in accordance 
with the confirmed ratio of oil production in each area (The Vanguard, 1993, p. 11).  (The 
government provided for the allocation of 3 percent of the central government‟s account 
to OMPADEC, double of the 1.5 percent that had been allocated for the development of 
the oil-producing areas before the establishment of OMPADEC.)  Many perceived the 
establishment  of  OMPADEC  to  be  a  positive  development  and  a  reflection  of  the 
government‟s commitment to improving the quality of life of the Niger Delta people 
(Akinyele, 1997, p. 83). 
   OMPADEC was established by the Ibrahim Babangida government (1985-1993). 
Its structure was such that all the states in the Niger Delta were represented on the board 
of the commission. There was thus some feeling that with the creation of OMPADEC, the 
people had an authentic opportunity to participate in the running of their own affairs (The 
Vanguard, 1996, p. 18).  Between 1992 and 1996, when its operations were suspended by 
the Sanni Abacha government, OMPDEC claimed to have undertaken projects including 
land reclamation and shore protection; the distribution of pipe borne water; the building 
of hospitals, health facilities, and schools; and the construction of drainage systems. It 
also claimed to have been granting loans to individual farmers and cooperative societies. 
However, it was not long before OMPADEC itself became rocked by corruption and 
scandal,  and  the  reality  was  that  the  commission  had  erected  numerous  signposts  of 
projects that were abandoned half way or not commenced at all (Osuntokun, 2000, p. 3).  
The failure of OMPADEC certainly represented another missed opportunity to enhance 
human security in the Niger Delta and reduce violence in the area. 
  The  failure  to  find  an  effective  solution  to  the  environmental  and  economic 
problems  of  the  Niger  Delta  led  to  an  increase  in  violence  and  complicated  conflict 
resolution  efforts  in  the  1990s.  Violence  was  worsened  by  Abacha‟s  hostility  to 
environmental  rights  activism,  which  culminated  in  the  execution  of  playwright  and 
activist Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa on 10 November 1995. The struggle in the Niger 
Delta  quickly  became  a  struggle  against  mass  murder  by  the  government  (Falola  & 
Heaton 2008, pp. 231-234).  To worsen matters, Abacha transported people from all parts 
of Nigeria to the country‟s capital of Abuja in his ill-conceived “ten million man march” 
to give legitimacy to his bid to transform himself into a civilian president in 1996. Many 
of those that came from the Niger Delta saw how beautiful Abuja was and felt worse 
about  their condition.  They returned home and  became more determined to  fight  the 
government.  The 1990s thus  represented a period of unprecedented  expansion  of the 
violence in the Niger Delta. To illustrate developments of the period, thirty-six oil rigs 
were active in the Niger Delta in 1991. By 1994, only fourteen were being operated, and Journal of International and Global Studies 
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the number dropped to just ten in 1998 (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 23). In most cases, 
local communities had seized drilling rigs in the course of their protests, and the number 
of active rigs shrank progressively in the course of the 1990s. 
  A new civilian government was inaugurated in Nigeria in May 1999 after fifteen 
years of military rule. The new government took steps to address the conflict in the Niger 
Delta as soon as it took office. Yet another development commission, the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) was established as a successor to the OMPADEC in 
1999. The government also increased the allocation from oil revenue to producing areas 
to  13  percent  (Aworawo,  2012:  37-38,  44-47).  Efforts  were  made  to  reach  out  to 
community leaders as well as women and youth organizations to reduce violence in the 
area to the barest minimum (Osuntokun 2000, 3).  In spite of these efforts, violence 
continued apace in  the Niger Delta in  the opening  years of the  21
st century.  Violent 
groups such as the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), led by Tom Ateke, the Niger 
Delta People‟s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dokubo, and the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), led by Henry Okah, emerged and brought 
sophistication to the Niger Delta crisis by leading the people in organized protests and 
helping delta residents clearly articulate and present their demands to the government and 
executives of the oil companies. Oil installations were sabotaged, and production was 
drastically reduced (Ukaogo, 2008, pp. 104-107).  This compelled the government to 
intensify efforts to resolve the conflict. 
  The  NDDC  continued  its  activities  of  providing  infrastructure  in  parts  of  the 
Niger Delta, and it  recorded some achievements in  this  respect.  It  also  embarked on 
human  capacity  development,  which  enhanced  human  security  to  some  degree.  The 
NDDC and its leadership were also involved in direct conflict resolution efforts, which 
included the amnesty program introduced by the government 2009. The program, which 
was introduced by President Yar‟Adua to address the violence in the Niger Delta, granted 
amnesty to all militants who surrendered their arms and gave up violence. Rehabilitation 
and training programs  have been established for former militants, with  a measure of 
success (The Punch, 2010, p. 28; The Guardian, 2009a, p. 51). Although the amnesty 
program has had its difficulties, and indeed some have described the program as a quick 
fix (Abidde, 2011, p. 12), it has contributed to a drastic reduction of violence in the Niger 
Delta at least in the short run, and it can be said that the process of conflict resolution has 
received immense attention since the amnesty program was launched. 
  An important aspect that has yet to receive adequate attention in efforts to resolve 
the  Niger  Delta  conflict,  however,  has  been  protection  of  the  environment  and  the 
regeneration  of  devastated  lands  and  polluted  rivers  (Osuntokun,  2012,  pp.  508-513; 
Chokor, 2000, pp. 62-64).  
 As already noted, efforts to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
have yielded only modest results, as the 2008 deadline set by government was not met. In 
addition,  incidents  of  oil  spill  remain  widespread  mainly  because  oil-producing 
companies fail to comply with international safety standards. It is important that more 
attention be paid to environmental protection and that higher standards be adopted by oil 
companies in their operations. This would enable the people of the Niger Delta engage in 
fruitful economic activities and enhance human security. It is expected that these steps 
would also further enhance the conflict resolution process in the Niger Delta since, as 
local  leaders,  activists,  women  leaders,  and  militants  have  consistently  maintained, 
deprivation has been a major cause of the violence in the area (The News, 2013; Okecha, Deprivation and Resistance: Environmental Crisis, Political Action, and Conflict Resolution  
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2000; Usiwo, 2007; Afebuamhe, 2012; Ogunbor, 2012). This is the kind of step that is 
expected of any government that is serious-minded and perceptive.  
  Since  the  declaration  of  amnesty  for  militants  in  2009,  (which  has  been 
accompanied by a small measure of attention to environmental protection of attention to 
environmental protection,  along with some human capacity development and expansion 
of infrastructure in the Niger Delta), the government has had a more legitimate base from 
which to deal with the few people who have attempted to carry out violence in the area 
since that time. Indeed, reports indicate a drastic reduction in violent acts in the Niger 
Delta since 2010, which establishes the correlation between environmental degradation, 
deprivation, and violence. It is noteworthy that the reduced levels of violence in the Niger 
Delta  since  2010  have  made  it  possible  for  the  government  to  increase  its  crude  oil 
exports from just about a million barrels per day in 2008 to 2.3 million barrels per day in 
2012 (Ukaogo, 2008, pp. 103-104; Dokpesi, 2012, pp. 119-122), perhaps incentivizing 
the government to continue to take further measures to ensure the wellbeing and security 
of  the  residents  of  the  delta.  It  is  in  this  way  that  paying  greater  attention  to 
environmental protection and to the welfare of the people of the delta would provide an 
opportunity for the government to demonstrate enlightened self-interest.  In many parts of 
the world today, environmental issues have become part of strategic thinking; they have 
also formed the basis for assessing the success or failure of governments and government 
agencies and constitute an important issue in election campaigns (Petroleum News, 1998, 
pp. 12-13).   The Nigerian government would therefore need to pay more attention to 
environmental protection as it seeks to enhance human security and end the violence in 
the Niger Delta.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the pattern of violence and dynamics of conflict resolution in the 
Niger  Delta  since  the  1980s  presented  in  this  paper  reveals  the  link  between 
environmental degradation, poverty, and violence. Environmental pollution caused by oil 
exploitation in the region hampered the traditional economic activities of the people of 
the Niger Delta, and this intensified poverty and caused violence in the period studied. 
This  violence  is  clearly  revealed  in  origin,  and  the  pattern  of  the  conflict  is  clearly 
demonstrated. The protection of the environment and provision of human security should 
therefore be important issues to address in the process of conflict resolution. Protection of 
the environment and restoration of polluted lands and water to a healthy state are crucial 
because protection and regeneration of the environment make it possible for the people to 
be engaged in productive economic activities and improve their quality of life.  Indeed, 
wherever deprivation exists, resistance against the forces responsible for that deprivation 
logically  exists  as  well.    It  is  therefore  a  matter  of  enlightened  self-interest  for  the 
government  and  polluters  of  the  environment  in  the  Niger  Delta  work  to  ensure  a 
healthier  physical  environment  and  improve  human  security.    Certainly,  no  one  has 
benefited  from  the  unfulfilled  promises  made  by  different  environmental  protection 
agencies or agencies organized to  establish infrastructure and implement programs to 
improve the quality of life of the people.  Unfulfilled promises only serve to foment 
further violence. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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  The reality is that violence is reduced only when authentic measures are taken to 
improve the conditions that precipitated resistance in the first place. As such, violence in 
the  delta  region  has  been  substantially  reduced  since  2010,  when  the  government 
implemented a program that has expanded infrastructure and enhanced human security in 
the  area.  The  substantial  reduction  in  acts  of  sabotage  against  government  and  oil 
companies‟ facilities since government became more committed to the fulfillment of its 
promises to the people confirms that the provision of human security has a clear and 
direct relationship with conflict resolution.  It also emphasizes the need for government to 
pay  increased  attention  to  environmental  regeneration  since,  as  has  been  established, 
pollution has contributed tremendously to poverty but not has not yet been broadly or 
systematically addressed. The United Nations report on the environment of the Niger 
Delta  published  in  August  2011  recommends  large  scale  activities  to  regenerate  the 
devastated environment. The undertaking of such activities should be one of the most 
realistic and effective ways of further reducing poverty and violence in the Niger Delta. 
Efforts  to  resolve  the  violence  in  the  area  must  therefore  directly  address  both  the 
improvement  of  the  quality  of  life  of  the  delta  residents  and  the  regeneration  of  the 
physical environmental. This is the only way to achieve enduring peace in the Niger 
Delta because it addresses the roots of the conflict. 
                                                 
1 A gas flare (or flare stack) is a gas combustion device used in industrial plants (e.g. petroleum refineries 
chemical plants, natural gas processing plants, or oil and gas production sites). Flare stacks are primarily 
used for burning off flammable gas; they are also used for the planned combustion of gases over relatively 
short  periods.  In  areas  of  the  world  lacking  pipelines  and  other  gas  transportation  infrastructure,  vast 
amounts of such associated gas are commonly flared as waste or unusable gas. Gas flaring constitutes a 
hazard to human health and is a contributor to the worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide. In 2011, Nigeria 
was the second highest contributor to world gas flaring. 
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